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The Beginning of Herstory for Corporate Law
Kellye Y. Testy1
It is early 2001.  Two leading corporate scholars together declare the
“end of history for corporate law.” 2  For them, American style corporate
governance—grounded in neo-classical economics and revolving on the axis
of shareholder primacy—has so far eclipsed any competing models that there
is nothing left to talk about.  The triumph of free-market capitalism is
assured, both in developed and developing nations.
Forward to September 11, 2001.  Al Qaeda terrorists level the World Trade
Center’s twin towers, damage the Pentagon, crash yet another jet into
Pennsylvania farm land, and kill thousands who had gone to work thinking
that tomorrow would be hump day.  “The terrorists had launched a direct
attack on the American system.  Their actions expressed not only disregard
for human life, but also disdain for the foundations of American govern-
ment, law, and our capitalist methods of production, distribution, and
exchange.”3  In addition to the tremendous human tragedy of 9-11, the
attacks also deepened an economic downturn in the United States, triggering
widespread corporate layoffs, cutbacks, and a steep decline in stock prices.
 Forward now to December 2, 2001.  Despite reporting over $100 billion
in revenues on its 2000 10-K, the Enron corporation files for bankruptcy, the
largest ever recorded—at least until July when WorldCom followed suit and
broke Enron’s infamous record.4  In their wake, a wave of corporate account-
ing and self-dealing scandals followed, further shaking the capital markets
and pushing the economy deeper into recession.  Company after company
“restated” earnings and battled multiple investigations and lawsuits, as did
their accountants and investment bankers.  Few were immune from the
effects of “Enronitis.”  Even the goddess of domesticity, Martha Stewart,
was caught in the undertow of corporate wrongdoing when she dumped 4,000
ImClone Systems shares just ahead of a large downward stock-price slide;5
and Wall Street’s own deity, Harvey Pitt, was cast asunder after failing to
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disclose that the man he supported to head corporate clean-up efforts was
already knee-deep in boardroom muck.6
And so it seems that if indeed the end of history for corporate law has
come, something else needs to be written in its place.  Herstory, perhaps?
In The Gender Implications of Corporate Governance Change, Janis
Sarra presents what has until now seemed oxymoronic to many: a feminist
economic analysis of corporate governance in the global marketplace.7  In so
doing, she joins a growing chorus of corporate governance scholars who are
seeking to advance an alternative vision to the neoclassical, shareholder-
centered model that is not only dominant in the United States, but is
also widely exported—even to nations that do not share similar institu-
tional configurations that support such a model.8  This diverse group of
scholars—whose approaches have been labeled variously as “progressive,”
“communitarian,” and “socio-economic,”—do not view the above events of
2001-02 as aberrations in an otherwise solid American political and corpo-
rate landscape.  Instead, these scholars see these events as the expected
by-products of a post-Reagan political economy that has celebrated self-
interest, undermined the rule of law, and drastically widened societal wealth
inequalities by any reliable measure.  For them, the case has yet to be made
that shareholder wealth maximization equates with anything but—shareholder
benefit, much less societal benefit.9
What Sarra’s work adds to this chorus is an explicit and extensive consid-
eration of the many ways that gender is ignored or minimized in corporate
governance decisions and debates.  She summarizes: “Most theoretical
approaches to corporate governance are modelled on strong historical
notions of property and thus on a particular distribution of economic power
that is highly gendered within the marketplace.  They generally fail to articu-
late and value the experience and contributions of women to the economic
and social life of corporations, and thus the distributive effects of various
governance models.”10
More specifically, Sarra highlights the normative values at work in several
key pillars of corporate law that are often seen as value-free:  the nexus-of-
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contracts approach to the firm, shareholder primacy, and economic efficiency.
She then goes on to call for increased attention to women’s roles as investors
and workers in corporations, and for more racial and gender diversity on
corporate boards.   Finally, she demonstrates that a feminist analysis of cor-
porate governance can also be an economic analysis.  The two work together
to maximize the wealth of the enterprise, and in turn, all of its constituents.
Were Sarra’s points taken to heart as corporate governance reform efforts
get underway in the aftermath of the events of 2001-02, not only would women
be better off, but society as a whole would benefit as well.  Feminist legal
theory—as Sarra likely would agree—has never been directed solely at
making a special case for women.  Instead, it charts an alternative normative
vision of the relationship between life and law, one grounded on the value of
equality and dedicated to human flourishing.  And as recent events have
convincingly shown, when it comes to corporate governance, that new
vision is both long overdue and sorely needed.
1
 Wismer Professor and Associate Professor of Law, Seattle University.
2
 Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89
GEO. L.J. 439 (2001).
3
 Faith Stevelman Kahn, Bombing Markets, Subverting the Rule of Law: Enron, Financial
Fraud, and September 11, 2001, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1579, 1580–81 (2002).  See also
Amy L. Chua, The Paradox of Free Market Democracy: Rethinking Development Policy,
41 HARV. INT’L L.J. 287 (2000) (proposing that democratic governance and market
capitalism are not necessarily convergent).
4
 James K. Glassman, When Trust Collides With Risk, WASH. POST, Dec. 9, 2001, at H01;
James Rowley et al., WorldCom Former Officers Surrender to FBI in New York, BLOOMBERG
NEWS, Aug. 1, 2002.
5
 Ben White & Brooke A. Masters, SEC Staff Endorses Charging Stewart, WASH. POST,
Oct. 22, 2002, at A01.
6
 David S. Hilzenreth & Mike Allen, Besieged Pitt Quits as SEC Chairman, WASH. POST,
Nov. 6, 2002, at A02.
7
 Janis Sarra, The Gender Implications of Corporate Governance Change, 1 SEATTLE J.
SOC. JUST. 457 (2002).
8
 See LAWRENCE MITCHELL, CORPORATE IRRESPONSIBILITY: AMERICAN’S NEWEST EXPORT (2001).
9
 See, e.g., Kellye Y. Testy, Linking Progressive Corporate Law with Progressive Social
Movements, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1227 (2002), and sources cited therein.  See generally Socio-
Economics and Corporate Law Symposium: The New Corporate Social Responsibility,
76 TUL. L. REV. 1187 (2002).
10
 Sarra, at 460.
